INTRODUCTION
Since 1970 the distribution of wages in the United States has become substantially more unequal (Katz and Murphy 1992) . "Between-group" inequality has risen since 1980, whereas withingroup inequality has increased more or less steadily since 1970. Because the rise in inequality has occurred against a back-drop of more or less stagnant real wages on average, various labor market groups experienced a decline in real wages over all, or part of, the post-1970 period.
Economists have written extensively about the post-1970 rise in wage inequality and its causes, with varying degrees of success. It is fair to say, however, that virtually all of this literature treats the post-1970 period as self-contained; or, if historical context is offered, it is usually restricted to the post-1940 period. The purpose of this paper is to place the recent rise in wage inequality in a much longer historical context, one covering essentially the full sweep of American history since the onset of industrialization, defined for my purposes to be the 1820s. In keeping with the literature on the current period, the primary focus is on "skill" based wage inequalityfor example, differences associated with occupations, or other indicators of human capital.
Why view the recent rise in wage inequality through a (very) long-term lens? A long-term historical context is useful in assessing whether the recent rise in wage inequality is an unusual event in and of itself, and whether levels of inequality observed today are unprecedented, as some scholars believe them to be. It is also useful in determining whether there have been secular trends in inequality, or whether inequality change has been primarily episodic. The causes of changing wage inequality, as well, may be unique to the institutional setting of each historical period, or there may be continuity in explanatory factors. Answers to such questions have implications for theories of economic development in the short and long run, and possibly for economic policies to address both the causes and consequences of inequality change. This paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 examines issues of measurement and evidence; it also summarizes the relevant portions of the influential and well-known study by Williamson and Lindert (1980) . The remainder of the paper discusses recent research on the history of wage inequality, dividing up the chronology in terms of sub-periods (1820-1860, 1860-1900-1900-1940, and 1940-1970) .
MEASUREMENT AND EVIDENCE
Ideally, measurement of the level (or change) in wage inequality should be based on the full distribution of wages. Due to the influence of the Mincer model in labor economics, numerical measures of the distribution of log wages (eg. the variance) have been widely used in studies of the post-1970 rise in wage inequality. Also popular are various range statistics that measure the distance (in logs) between various quantiles of the wage distribution, such as the 10-90 spread.
Prior to 1940, however, it is extremely difficult (though not impossible, see below) to analyze wage inequality other than in terms of differences in average wages between various labor market groups. 1 Virtually all analyses of pre-1940 patterns of wage inequality are based on occupational averages; in particular, the ratio of average wages in a skilled occupation, typically blue collar, to average wages in an unskilled occupation (eg. common labor, manufacturing operatives) 2 The implicit-albeit somewhat dubious-assumptions are that occupations are a reasonable proxy for skills and that within and between-group inequality generally have trended together, so that one (or the other) can serve as a proxy for overall inequality. 3 Students of late 20 th century labor markets have an abundance of data on wages, much of it individually-based, with which to study levels and changes in wage inequality. The public use microdata samples (or PUMS) of the 1940 and subsequent decennial censuses provide information on weekly wages in the year preceding the census, as well as data on weeks worked. 4 At annual frequencies trends in wage inequality in recent decades are frequently studied using the Perhaps the most important question of bias concerns the retrospective nature of both surveys. Technically, the samples are unbalanced panels, with the length of the panel dependent on when the firm first came into existence and whether it survived long enough to be sampled. On an apriori basis it seems likely that firms that came into existence long before the date or either survey, but surviving to be included in either source, are an unbiased cohort sample of all firms. Even if selectivity were not an issue, sample size is: the number of observations dated 1850 or before falls off drastically, particularly if the samples are stratified by occupation or region. 8 6 The precise methods by which firms were selected into both samples cannot be determined exactly from the published documentation, but it is clear that neither was a random sample in the modern sense.
7 Both reports also contained abundant data on prices; Coehlo and Shepherd (1974) , for example, use the Weeks data to construct regional price indices for the second half of the 19 th century. Adams (1968 , 1970 , 1982 , 1986 ) and Rothenberg (1992 . 1929 and 1950 to more rapid growth in total factor productivity in agriculture, assumed to be intensive in the use of unskilled labor. Factor supplies also mattered: for example, skill differentials increased in the early part of the 20 th century because of high rates of immigration, which swelled the ranks of unskilled labor.
perspective. James and Skinner (1985) argued, on the basis of production functions estimated using mid-19th century census data, that capital and unskilled labor were relative complements, not capital and skilled labor (see also Goldin and Katz 1995) . Grosse (1982) 
NEW EVIDENCE ON ANTEBELLUM SKILL DIFFERENTIALS
Largely due to the influence of Williamson and Lindert's work, a new project was launched in the early 1980s to collect additional archival data on wages in the 19 th century. Thus far, the data collection phase of the project has been completed for the 1820 to 1860 period. 12 The primary data source was Reports of Persons and Articles Hired, a collection of payrolls stored at the National Archives, perhaps the largest collection of its kind for the 19 th century United States.
During the 19 th century the United States Army maintained forts and outposts throughout the country. At many (in fact, most) of these installations it proved necessary at various times for the quartermaster at the post to hire civilians from the local labor market to perform tasks for which soldiers could not be spared (or did not have the skills to perform). At the end of each month, quartermasters were required to prepare a summary payroll (the "Report" which the title of the collection refers to) documenting the hiring of civilian workers, including pay and some worker and job characteristics. Approximately 62,000 wage observations have been collected and put into 11 Government behavior can be considered in the CGE model, however, to the extent that government policies altered factor supplies (for example, the closing of the frontier in the late 19 th century, or the cut-off in immigration during World War One) or technical change (for example, through government funded research and development). Because the model is cast in real terms, the effects of nominal shocks or other macro-economic events cannot be readily addressed. However, there is considerable evidence of nominal wage lags well before the Civil War that were non-neutral with respect to occupation; see Margo (1999, ch. 7) .
12 Preliminary analyses of data collected during the first phase of the project were reported in Margo and Villaflor (1987) , Margo (1992) , and Goldin and Margo (1992a) , and the completed analysis is scheduled to appear in book form in Margo (1999) . The NSF has recently funded a proposal to complete the second phase of the data collection (1860 to 1900). machine-readable form. 13 The data cover all regions of the country --including the far West --and a wide variety of occupations found in civilian life (as well as a few specific to the military, such as "Indian spy").
Of course, these data would be of little interest to anyone -except, perhaps, military historians -if wages paid to the Army's civilian employees were arbitrarily set, independent of labor market conditions in the civilian economy. However, there is considerable evidence that the army did not behave this way; rather, it appears to have simply paid the going wage in the local labor market surrounding the fort, conditional on occupation (see Margo and Villaflor 1987; Margo 2000, ch. 2) Thus, for example, a comparison of wages paid to common laborers and teamsters, or carpenters and masons, at the Erie Canal, with workers in employed in these occupations at forts in upstate New York evidences no differences between the two.
Although the size, occupational, and geographic coverage of the sample are a vast improvement over wage data previously available for the antebellum period, the sample is not sufficiently large to estimate, say, annual time series of average wages by occupation at each fort.
Few forts were operated continuously over time, and none hired every type of worker in every year.
Computation of a wage series -for example, by averaging wages across forts in a given occupation -that ignored these compositional shifts could be highly misleading. To deal with this problem, hedonic (log) wage regressions were estimated, pooling the data over time, within broad occupational groups and census regions. Using the coefficients of the year dummies from these regressions, in conjunction with benchmark wage estimates for 1850, annual time series of nominal daily or monthly wages were constructed for period 1821 to 1860, for three occupational groups (common labor, skilled artisans, and clerks) in each of the four major census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South Atlantic, and South Central) -a total of twelve nominal wage series (Margo 2000, ch. 3).
Using previously collected regional data on prices, real wage series were constructed. With additional cross-sectional information, it proved possible to benchmark regional wage levels in 1850 so that differences in real wage levels across regions could be incorporated into the time series. Finally, making use of revisions to the 19 th century labor force statistics recently completed by Thomas Weiss (1992) , the regional series were aggregated to the national level. Five year averages of the real wage series, with each occupational series indexed to 100 in 1856-60, are shown in Table 1 . Also shown are growth rates ($) of the series, estimated as the coefficient of a linear time trend in a time series regression of the log wage (ln w = " + $t + ,).
It is immediately evident that real wage growth was positive before the Civil War. Rather more significantly, when the occupational series are aggregated into a single overall series the trend 13 Here, an "observation" refers to the occurrence of a wage -typically, daily or monthly -in a payroll.
growth rate of the aggregate real wage (0.97 percent per year) matches almost exactly the best current estimate of the growth in real output per worker (0.99 percent per year) between 1820 and 1860 (Weiss 1992) .
It is also evident from Table 1 artisans and common labor. However, the new data do suggest that the wages of clerks (the major white collar occupation of the period) increased at a moderately faster pace before the Civil War than wages of common labor (see Table 1 and Figure 3 ). Nineteenth century clerks (almost all of whom were male) were frequently involved with accounting and management tasks of the enterprises; they were, in other words, the "educated" workers of their day, on a fast track to upper levels of management (such as these were). Although the spread of the factory system may not have enhanced the relative wages of skilled artisans, it is entirely plausible that managerial skills and capital were relative complements. The working hypothesis, then, is that the relative demand for educated labor rose before the Civil War; and, because the relative supply of such skills was less than perfectly elastic, the skill differential (measured in white collar terms) increased.
Furthermore, economy-wide estimates of the clerk-to-unskilled wage for the 1850s are similar to estimates for the 1890s (Margo 2000, ch. 7; Goldin and Katz 1999b) . As Goldin and
Katz demonstrate (see the next section), the expansion of secondary schooling after the turn of the 20 th century dramatically reduced the returns to educated labor, and a further reduction took place in the 1940s (Goldin and Margo 1992a; see below) . Although much more work needs to be done, a Kuznets-curve in the relative wages of educated labor may be accorded the status of a stylized fact of American economic development.
THE CIVIL WAR AND POST-BELLUM PERIOD, 1860 TO 1900
The wage history of the Civil War and subsequent post-bellum period has received less detailed scrutiny than either the ante-bellum period or the 20 th century -an unfortunate state of affairs, for there are good reasons, as noted earlier, to believe that the standard wage sources for the periodthe Weeks and Aldrich reports --are less than fully satisfactory. Nevertheless, both reports provide the primary evidence from which various scholars have constructed series of skill differentials covering the 1860 to 1900 period.
Figures 4 and 5 graph two such series, one computed by Burgess (1920) covering the differentials remained more or less constant during the Civil War but began to drift upwards late in the 1860s. According to the Burgess series, the upward drift continued through the 1870s before tapering off in the 1880s; the Williamson series, however, suggests a much more modest overall increase in skill differentials over the second half of the 19 th century. 14 As noted repeatedly in this paper, almost all wage inequality in 19 th century US history rely on trends in aggregate skill differentials. However, for at least a portion of the 1860 to 1900
period it is possible to shed some light on changes in wage differentials at a lower level of aggregation. The focus is on manufacturing over the period 1860 to 1880, a period of substantial change in technology and organizational form that led to increases in firm size and market power --the beginnings of the rise of the modern corporation (Atack 1985 ). I use firm-level data from samples collected from the manuscript censuses of manufacturing in 1860 and 1880 by Jeremy
Atack and Fred Bateman, as well as data from a special census inquiry -the so-called "Census of
Social Statistics" -in 1860 that reported extensive wage information at the level of minor civil divisions. 15 Taking the manufacturing data first, the 1880 sample is straightforward to analyze, because it reported the average daily wage of common labor and the average daily wage of "mechanics", or skilled (blue-collar) labor. In 1860, however, the manufacturing census reported the "average monthly cost of male labor". It is possible to restrict both samples to firms in fulltime operation, here assumed to be 12 months, and it is also possible to restrict both samples to firms employing only male workers. Finally, using the data from the 1860 Census of Social Statistics, it is possible to restrict attention to firms that plausibly employed mostly -or totallyunskilled labor, thus rendering comparisons possible between 1860 and 1880.
Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the distribution of the log of unskilled daily wages in 1860, as computed from the social statistics and manufacturing data, as well as for 1880. The social statistics sample comprises minor civil divisions in eight states, two from each of 14 Interestingly, if the post-1860 Williamson series is spliced onto the Margo (1999) shown in Figure 2 , the artisan-to-common wage ratio rose by about 11 percent from the late 1840s to the late 1890s, but was virtually the same in the 1890s as in the 1820s. However, following the Williamson series into the 20 th century, however, skill differentials rose quite markedly between 1900 (a value of 1.825) to 1916 (1.989) -as noted earlier, period of substantial growth in the relatively supply of unskilled labor, due to high rates of immigration. 15 In 1850, 1860, and for a final time in 1870, the US Census Office conducted a special inquiry at the level of minor civil divisions called the "Census of Social Statistics". Data were collected by census enumerators on a wide variety of miscellaneous social indicators (for example, churches by denomination, newspapers, libraries) and, in addition, on wages. In particular, data were collected on the average daily wages of "common" (unskilled) nonfarm labor and carpenters, both without board, and both pertaining to male workers only. However, appearances are somewhat deceiving, for the wage data were not true averages; rather enumerators seem to have asked a few knowledgeable individuals --most likely, employers --what the going rate of pay was. At the level of a minor civil division, it is likely that the data are quite similar to firm-level observations, an inference born out by comparison with the manufacturing data for 1860 (see Table 2 ). the major census regions; for comparison purposes, the manufacturing samples are limited to firms located in these states. The daily wage of unskilled labor in manufacturing is defined to be: daily wage, mfg = (Average monthly cost of male labor/number of male workers)/25.8 where "25.8" is the presumed number of days of operation of full-time firms. Crucially for the analysis, the manufacturing wage is constrained to fall between the 1rst and 99 th percentiles of the log wage distribution computed from the social statistics sample. As is apparent, the two 1860 distributions match up reasonably well: depending on how the labor input is computed, the sample means are similar, as are the standard deviations (although the variation in the social statistics sample is slightly smaller than across manufacturing firms). 16 Panel B computes the change in manufacturing wage inequality between 1860 and 1880. It is clear that inequality increased, whether measured by the change in the standard deviation, or in the various range statistics shown. Table 3 repeats the exercise using the full manufacturing samples; the results are substantively unaffected.
Why did manufacturing wage inequality increase between 1860 and 1880? Location is one reason: the South's loss in the Civil War produced an apparent widening in its per capita income gap with the North (Easterlin 1960; Barro and Sali-i-Martin 1992) , and it is plausible that this effect was at work in the case of manufacturing wages. Table 4 reports the effect on the standard deviation of the log wage in both years, controlling for various factors reported in the sample, including state, urban-rural status, and industry. Clearly state (and to a lesser extent, urban-rural) differences in wages grew between 1860 and 1880; further analysis of the regression coefficients (not shown) demonstrates that the principal change was, in fact, an increase in the gap in manufacturing wages between the South Atlantic and the rest of the nation (cf. Wright 1986) . 17 Location, however, may not have been the only factor at work. Regressions (not shown) on the 1880 sample reveal a positive effect of capital intensity and firm size on the daily wage of unskilled labor. The variances of both variables increased between 1860 and 1880, suggesting that 16 Elsewhere (Margo 2000, ch. 4 ) I have shown that there is no evidence of substantial wage gaps for unskilled labor between the farm and non-farm sectors, whether non-farm refers to manufacturing, or in more general terms, in 1850 and 1860. 17 It is important to note that a North-South wage gap did not first emerge after the Civil War, but apparently in the 1830s (Margo 2000, ch. 5) . The Civil War, in other words, exacerbated a gap already present. The role of region in this instance highlights an important difference between the 19 th and 20 th centuries; most analyses of wage inequality since 1970 effectively assume an integrated "national" labor market, an assumption that would be less than fully appropriate for the pre-1940 period. the emergence of large scale, capital intensive firms may have produced a widening dispersion of manufacturing wages. 18
CHANGES IN WAGE STRUCTURE, 1900-1970 1900 to 1940
Although some features remain murky, there is abundant evidence that the wage structure compressed between the turn of the twentieth century and 1940. Factors that have been suggested to account for the compression include changes in immigration policy, educational expansion, and unionization.
A number of attempts have been made to chart the evolution of the wage structure from the turn of the century to World War. Early studies by Douglas (1926) , Lebergott (1947 ), Ober (1948 , Bell (1951) and especially Keat (1960) relied, for the most part, on skill differentials to build a case. As an example, Ober (see also Keat 1960) computed wage ratios using annual data on skilled and unskilled workers in the building trades (all of which were unionized) from 1907 to 1947, along with a broader set of skilled occupations at various dates over the same period. He, like the others cited above, found substantial declines in skill differentials in the 1940s, but also an earlier period of decline ca. World War One. Because of various deficiencies in the data sources used in these studies, however, the timing of change remains unclear.
For white collar occupations, the most comprehensive early studies were made by Paul Douglas. Douglas estimated wage series for low-level managers and "ordinary" clerical workers, such as typists, stenographers, and book-keepers. Using these series in conjunction with others on unskilled labor, Douglas argued that there was a substantial decline in the relative wages of white collar workers before 1930. In explaining this decline, Douglas pointed to educational expansion which, he claimed, substantially increased the relative supply of educated workers after the turn of the century -workers who were well-trained to enter white-collar occupations in the burgeoning service economy of the early 20 th century.
Recent work by Goldin and Katz (1995 , 1999a , 1999b has significantly expanded our knowledge of pre-1940 trends in the wage structure, as well as clarify the timing of important changes. First, using industry data from1890 (from the federal census of manufacturing) along with similar data collected by the BLS circa World War Two, Goldin and Katz show that the 18 Why firm size and capital intensity were positively correlated with wages is unclear. The correlations may indicate that more able workers -albeit "unskilled" -were more likely to be employed in large scale, capital intensive firms; or that the work environment in such firms was undesirable, and to compensate the firms had to pay higher wages; or that such firms competed for workers in a labor market (or markets) that, for whatever reason, was less than perfectly integrated with the general market for unskilled labor, and the supply curve of unskilled labor to large scale, capital intensive firms, in the aggregate, was upward sloping.
distribution of wages compressed among production workers within manufacturing (see Panel A
of Table 5 ) Since there is, at present, no evidence that the inter-industry wage structure changed between 1890 and 1940, Goldin and Katz's result suggest a more general compression in manufacturing wages occurred as well.
Second, Goldin and Katz (see also Goldin and Margo 1992b) re-analyzed the white collar wage data used by Douglas, and also extended and revised standard wage series for college professors and engineers (see Table 5 for highlights). Unlike the Douglas series, which display a decline in the wages of white collar workers relative to unskilled labor just after 1900, the GoldinKatz series suggests that much of the initial decline occurred ca. World War One. Remarkably, this initial decline remained in place throughout the 1920s and (except for brief increases in the early 1930s) through the Great Depression, before undergoing an additional decline in the 1940s.
Also, it is important to note that, as economically and quantitatively significant as the "Great
Compression" of the 1940s was (see below), the pre-1940s declines in skill differentials were substantially greater (approximately twice as large), occurring over a much longer period. Goldin and Katz's (1999) have also produced series of annual wages for college professors and engineers; these, two, suggest that a substantial compression took place before 1940 (see Panel B
of Table 5 ).
Third, Goldin and Katz (1999a) Although the evidence at present is not complete, the wage compression in manufacturing appears to be due to secular declines in immigration (which decreased the relative labor supply of lowskilled labor), unionization, and educational expansion.
In particular, the so-called "high school movement", which began in the late 19 th century and which Goldin and Katz attribute to the high returns to education around the turn of the century, greatly expanded the relative supply of educated labor. 19 Some high school graduates were absorbed into the "high-tech" industries of the day, while others flooded the market for office work. In addition, high education also began to grow, although similar rates of expansion in the relative supply of college-educated labor were a product of the post-World War Two era.
The Great Compression and the Post-WWII Experience: 1940 to 1970
Williamson and Lindert's (1980) analysis of the American "Kuznets Curve" suggested a sharp decline in skill differentials between 1929 and 1950. Because this decline appeared (to Williamson and Lindert) to be a smooth one, they emphasized secular forces rather than episodic ones. More recent work on this period, however, suggests that the decline in wage inequality after 1929 was concentrated in the 1940s, and had much to do with events surrounding World War
Two (Goldin and Margo 1992b) . 20 Precise dating and magnitudes of the so-called "Great 19 However, the apparently similarity of clerk-to-unskilled wage ratios in the 1890s and the 1850s (see also Soltow and Stevens 1981) suggest that the rate of return to schooling was quite high long before the high school movement began -which raises the question as to which factors evidently inhibited widespread educational expansion prior to the late 19 th century.
The PUMS, then, clearly suggest a substantial reduction in wage inequality in the 1940s.
But, the compression could have merely been the continuation of a trend that began long before the 1940s, or possibly a response to a temporary disequilibrium induced by the Great Depression.
Although a complete, or nearly so, reconstruction of the evolution of the wage structure in the 1920s and 1930 remains to be done, Goldin and Margo (1992b) were able to produce several new series of skill differentials. One such series, pertaining to clerks and common labor employed on Class I steam railroads (see Figure 6 ), suggests that wage inequality increased in the early years of the Depression, but by 1939 had returned to 1929 levels, suggesting that the "Great
Compression" really was an episode associated with World War Two. 22 Goldin and Margo's explanation of the Great Compression emphasizes "demand-supply" factors as well as government intervention. To take the latter first, compression was at least partly the result of wartime price controls. First instituted in 1942, the price controls were under the purview of the National War Labor Board (NWLB). The NWLB adopted a number of rules of thumb when deciding whether to allow wage increases in particular industries; many of these clearly compressed the wage structure at the left tail (for example, exceptions were most frequently granted for cases in which the NWLB thought that "substandard" wages were being paid).
In addition, the war expanded the relative output of industries that were relatively intensive in the use of less-educated labor (eg. manufacturing) and reduced the relative output of industries that were intensive in the use of educated labor (such as college teaching). It is hard to factor out the precise effect of wartime demand and the NWLB, but Goldin and Margo attempted to do so by examining wage distributions of war and non-war related industries, before, during, and after the war. These distributions do suggest that the NWLB controls tended to compress left tails; however, it is also clear that compression continued after the war; and that the relative earnings of high skilled workers -the right tail -also compressed during, and after the War.
Why, then, did compression continue after the war? Goldin and Margo (1992b) examined trends in the relative demand for workers by education level between 1940-80; the 1940s were relative to the other decades, a decade of substantial increases in the relative demand for lesseducated workers (see also Autor, Krueger and Katz, 1998) . But this shift in demand was shortlived; the 1950s and 1960s were decades of substantial increases in the relative demand for educated workers. This suggests that certain supply shifts may have been were important: (1) there was an unexpected increase in the supply of educated labor after the war, caused the GI Bill, which financed the educations of soldiers and (2) there was a narrowing of geographic differences in the quality of schooling during the first half of the twentieth century, which also probably was a source of some compression. Other factors that functioned on the demand side were increases in the level and coverage of the federal minimum wage, level and coverage, and growth in unions.
In sum, the "Great Compression" of the 1940s was a unique episode caused by factors that were largely specific to the 1940s. The compression continued after the war for sometime but was beginning to unravel by the early 1950s. However, little further change in wage inequality took place in the 1960s, and in the 1970s wage differentials by education and experience actually declined, due to the entrance into the labor of the (relatively) highly educated "baby-boom" Although skill-based wage inequality today appears to be similar in levels to that experienced on the eve of World War Two, it also appears to be somewhat lower than levels in the early 20 th century. Further, the (percentage) increase in the relative supply of educated labor since the early 20 th century been much larger than the (percentage) decrease in skill differentials. Thus, the relative demand for educated labor must have risen secularly over the full sweep of the 20 th century, perhaps because, unlike their 19 th century counterparts, the new production techniques that emerged in the early 20 th century -as well as today -were characterized by capital-skill complementarity (Goldin and Katz 1995) .
CONCLUSION
This paper has surveyed recent research on the history of wage inequality in the United States over the period 1820 to 1970. There are several conclusions:
1. Over the course of the 19 th century, the ratio of wages of skilled blue collar workers to common labor did not follow an inverted U pattern, as conjectured by Williamson and Lindert. If anything, the ratio declined before the Civil War. However, after the Civil War, the ratio climbed to a level in the late 1890s similar to the level in the 1820s, and continued to increase until World War One.
2. The ratio of wages of white collar workers to common labor did increase over the course of the 19 th century. A significant portion of the increase took place before the Civil War, suggesting a key role for the influence of early industrialization on the demand for "managerial" skills.
3. There is some evidence that wage dispersion among unskilled labor in manufacturing increased between 1860 and 1880. While some of the increase was a consequence of a widening NorthSouth wage gap, increased dispersion in capital intensity and firm size -both aspects of the rise of the modern corporation --probably played a role.
4. Except for a brief period early in the century due to rapid increases in unskilled immigration, wage inequality declined between 1900 and 1940. By substantially boosting the relative supply of educated labor, educational expansion drove down the rate of return to schooling between World War One and World War Two, and further erosion in returns took place in the 1940s. Despite the recent rise in wage differentials by educational attainment, the returns to schooling today is probably somewhat lower than in the early 20 th century, indicating that the relative demand for educated labor has risen secularly over the full sweep of the 20 th century.
5. The early years of the Great Depression witnessed a sharp rise in wage inequality. But this increase dispersed by the end of the decade such that, on the eve of World War Two, inequality was probably no higher than in the late 1920s.
6. The "Great Compression" of the 1940s resulted in a substantial narrowing of wage inequality within and between groups. Although long-term supply side forces played a role in generating wage compression, much of the decrease in inequality was associated with the effects of World War Two on the relative demand for less-skilled labor, as well as government policies specific to the War.
7. The wage compression that occurred in the 1940s was sustained for some time after World War Two ended, but by 1960 inequality had begun to creep back towards pre-World War Two levels.
The baby boom, however, kept wage inequality from rising further in the 1970s.
8. With respect to the reasons posed in the Introduction for exploring historical context, it would appear that the history of wage inequality in the United States is one of both episodes and secular trends. Broadly speaking, both the episodes and secular trends can be explained by shifts in the relative demand and supply of labor of different skills. Some factors that shifted demand and supply have exhibited some continuity over time -for example, immigration and technical change-while others-for example, the Civil War or government policies adopted during World War Two -were specific to the era. As far as government policy is concerned, there is compelling historical evidence that long-term expansion of educational opportunity has been a potent factor in narrowing wage differentials. 23 Although I believe these conclusions to represent a reasonable statement of the "stylized facts" of the history of American wage inequality prior to 1970, there is still considerable room for further research. As noted repeatedly throughout the paper, most of what we know about wage inequality prior to 1940 --especially before 1900 --is really about inequality between groups, not within groups. This paper has provided some suggestive evidence on trends in wage dispersion in manufacturing during a portion of the second half of the 19 th century, and it may be possible to extend the analysis to other sectors and other time periods, albeit in a (very) limited way with presently available data sources. A good deal of additional work on explaining historical changes in wage inequality needs to be done -some, perhaps, along the lines of the CGE models pioneered by Williamson and Lindert (1980) as well as exploring how various institutional (and non-skill related) factors affected changes in wage inequality over time. 24 23 This presumes that expansion of the relative supply of educated labor does not alter the bias of technical change in favor of educated labor; see Acemoglu (1998) . 24 As is surely obvious to all readers of this paper, I have had nothing to say about long-term trends in wage differentials by race and gender, matters of great concern to labor economists. On long-term trends in gender-based wage differentials, see Goldin (1990) ; on racial differences, see Higgs (1977) , Margo (1990) , and Donohue and Heckman (1991) . Source: see Goldin and Katz (1999b) Source: Goldin and Margo (1992b) 
